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Comments
STANDING IN FRONT OF THE DISABLED: JUDICIAL
UNCERTAINTY OVER ENHANCED SIGHTLINES
IN SPORTS ARENAS
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years modern stadiums have been built for fans to
enjoy sporting events.1 Unfortunately, patrons who attend these
events are often bothered when people seated in front of them
stand up during an exciting moment of a game. 2 For most fans,
however, this is nothing more than a mere inconvenience, as they
can simply stand up to see the excitement as well.3 Although it is a
nuisance, most fans accept this as part of the experience of watch-
ing a live event.4
For disabled fans, however, this is more than a nuisance be-
cause they often cannot stand to see the excitement when a fan in
front of them stands up.5 Historically, disabled patrons have not
been able to enjoy the same benefits of attending sporting events
that others enjoy.6 Recently, awareness regarding the disabled
heightened as Congress enacted Title III of the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which prohibits discrimination against dis-
abled individuals in places of public accommodation. 7 Although
1. See Mark A. Conrad, Note, Wheeling Through Rough Terrain - The Legal Road-
blocks of Disabled Access in Sports Arenas, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 263, 264 (1998) (men-
tioning that construction of modern sports stadiums began after World War I).
Modem sports stadiums contain a capacity for tens of thousands of fans in several
levels. See id.
2. See Jonathan C. Fritts, Note, "Down in Front!". Judicial Deference, Regulatory
Interpretation, and the ADA's Line of Sight Standard, 86 GEO. L.J. 2653 (1998) (men-
tioning problem of standing patrons for disabled patrons).
3. See id. (stating that people will stand up so not to miss plays that may be-
come highlights).
4. See id. (commenting on general acceptance of inconvenience).
5. See id. (stating that "[i]nstead of seeing the home run or the touchdown,
[wheelchair patrons] are forced to look at the backside of the person in front of
them.").
6. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 264 (stating that disabled patrons were not able
to take advantage of facilities in 1920s and 1930s). During this period, the dis-
abled were also unable to take advantage of benefits others enjoyed in areas such
as employment and transportation. See id.
7. See Americans With Disabilities Act [hereinafter "ADA"], 42 U.S.C. § 12101-
12213 (1991).
(161)
1
Kurack: Standing in Front of the Disabled: Judicial Uncertainty over Enha
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
162 VILLANOVA SPORTS & Er. LAW JOURNAL [
many agree that the new attitude towards disabled individuals is
long overdue, questions arise over the enforcement of new regula-
tions and how much of a burden stadium owners should bear when
accommodating the disabled." The ambiguity of these regulations
has given rise to many conflicting court decisions. 9 As a result, un-
certainty exists for architects and owners constructing new
stadiums.10
This Comment discusses an aspect of that uncertainty by exam-
ining the split among circuits as to whether Title III of the ADA
requires enhanced lines of sight for those individuals in wheel-
chairs. Section II discusses the passage of Title III of the ADA and
the debate over whether the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
adopted the enhanced lines of sight standard.'" Section III exam-
ines the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the Department
ofJustice's Standards for Accessible Design, Standard 4.33.3.12 Sec-
tion IV discusses the future of Title III of the ADA and the resulting
impact that the enhanced lines of sight standard would have on
stadium operators if adopted by all courts. 13 Section V discusses
suggested solutions to resolve the dispute regarding the enhanced
lines of sight standard. 14 This Comment concludes with the sugges-
tion that Standard 4.33.3 should be interpreted to require en-
hanced lines of sight for disabled patrons.
II. BACKGROUND
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities by owners and operators of sports stadiums or
arenas. 15 The broad language of Title III protects individuals
8. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 265 (questioning uncertainty of Title III).
9. For an analysis of these conflicting court decisions, see infra notes 57-130
and accompanying text.
10. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 286 (believing that United States Supreme
Court must resolve confusion regarding "proper standard for sightline views" of
disabled).
11. For a discussion of the history of Title III of the ADA, see infra notes 15-56
and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the circuit split concerning the interpretation of Stan-
dard 4.33.3, see infra notes 57-130 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the future of Title III of the ADA and the resulting
impact that the enhanced lines of sight standard would have on stadium operators
if adopted by all courts, see infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the suggested solutions to resolve disputes concerning
the enhanced sightlines standard, see infra notes 138-58 and accompanying text.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA provides comprehensive civil rights
protections to disabled individuals, similar to protections given to people based on
race, sex and national origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed.
Vol. 8: p. 161
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against discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the . . . advantages or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases, or
operates a place of public accommodation." 16 Title III was passed
based on reports that "an overwhelming majority of individuals with
disabilities lead isolated lives and do not frequent places of public
accommodation."1 7 The overall goal of this statute was "to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against persons with disabilities."1 8
Under Title III, sports arenas are classified as either newly con-
structed facilities or existing facilities.1 9 For newly constructed facil-
ities, Title III requires that the stadium design be "readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities."20 The only exception
Reg. 2296 (Jan. 22, 1991) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191) [hereinafter "Acces-
sibility Guidelines"].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Public accommodation is defined, in part, as "a
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium or other place of exhibition
entertainment." Id. § 12181(7) (c).
17. H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 34 (1990). Congress enacted the ADA to
address what it believed to be a "serious and pervasive social problem ... discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3). In 1990,
the Act passed by an overwhelming majority of both the House and the Senate. See
136 CONG. REc. 17,251, 17,280 (1990) (noting 355 to 58 vote in House); 136 CONG.
REc. 17,364, 17,736 (1990) (noting 91 to 6 vote in Senate). Through the enact-
ment of Title III, Congress envisioned that all existing places of public accommo-
dation would be made accessible to the disabled to the extent that modifications
are readily achievable by owners, lessees, lessors, or operators. See James P. Col-
gate, Note, If You Build It, Can They Sue? Architects'Liability Under Title III of the ADA,
68 FoRnHAM L. REv. 137, 153-60 (1999) (discussing congressional intent behind
Title III).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1). Congress hoped to eliminate discrimination
against an estimated forty-three million Americans with disabilities by promulgat-
ing clear, consistent and enforceable standards. See id. § 12101 (b) (2). It has been
referred to as the "emancipation proclamation" for the disabled and "the most
sweeping piece of civil rights legislation possible in the history of our country, but
certainly since the Civil War era .... ." 135 CONG. RIc. 8506 (1989) (statement by
Sen. Harkin); see also 135 CONG. Rxc. 19,833, 19,847 (1989) (statement by Sen.
Hatch).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). New stadiums include those that are de-
signed and completed for "first occupancy" after January 26, 1990. Id. The DOJ
regulations provide examples of adequate dimensions for the size of bathroom
stalls, heights of drinking fountains, width of handicapped parking spots, and
length of curb parking. See Standards for Accessible Design, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304
(1993) [hereinafter "Standards"].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). "When alterations to an existing facility are
made, the altered portion must, to the maximum extent feasible, comply with the
Department ofJustice's architectural regulations." Thomas P. Murphy, Disabilities
Discrimination Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 36 CATH. LAW. 13, 36 (1995)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2)). Moreover, an alteration affecting access to a
main area of a facility must be made "in such a manner that, to the maximum
extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the bathrooms, tele-
2001]
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under this classification applies when it is "structurally impractica-
ble" for an arena to meet these requirements. 21 For existing facili-
ties, Title III requires reasonable modification to ensure access for
disabled patrons. 22
In order to formulate applicable standards for compliance with
Title III, Congress directed the Attorney General to issue regula-
tions setting forth guidelines for facilities covered under Title 111.23
Congress required these guidelines to be consistent with the mini-
mum guidelines set forth by the Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board ("Board").24 The guidelines issued by
phones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (2).
According to the ADA's legislative history, "the term 'readily accessible and
usable by' is intended to provide 'a high degree of convenient accessibility' and
enable people with disabilities (including mobility, sensory, and cognitive impair-
ments) to get to, enter and use a facility." Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 15,
at 2296 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 17-18) (1990).
21. Id.; see also Standards, supra note 19, § 36.401(c) (discussing "structurally
impracticable" exception). Structurally impractical means "those rare circum-
stances when the unique characteristic of the terrain prevents the incorporation of
accessibility features." Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 15, at 2296.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2). The DOJ ordered that:
A public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to afford
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to in-
dividuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demon-
strate that making the modification would fundamentally alter the nature
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations.
Standards, supra note 19, § 36.302(a). The DOJ also provided that "[a] public
accommodation shall remove all architectural barriers . . .that are structural in
nature, where such removal is readily achievable . . .and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense." Id. § 36.304.
To determine whether removal of a barrier is readily achievable, three factors
are considered. See Standards, supra note 19, § 36.301. First, the DOJ examines
the cost of removing the barrier. See id. Second, the financial resources of the
public accommodation owner are considered. See id. Third, the DOJ looks at the
safety requirements of the public accommodation. See id.
Since most entities owning a place of public accommodation have limited re-
sources, the DOJ prioritizes steps for removing barriers. See Standards, supra note
19, § 36.304(c). The first priority of the entity owning a place of public accommo-
dation is to provide access to the building. See id. Second, the entity must provide
access to goods and services available to the general public. See id. § 36.304(c) (2).
Third, the entity must ensure the disabled access to restrooms. See id.
§ 36.304(c) (3).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (directing Attorney General to issue regulations
for carrying out Title III). Additionally, the ADA provides individuals affected by
discrimination with a private cause of action to enforce provisions of the ADA. See
id. § 12188(a) (allowing individuals to sue for equitable relief).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c). The Board is a federal agency created by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compli-
ance Board, 29 U.S.C. § 792(a) (1999). The Board consists of thirteen individuals
appointed by the President and representatives of twelve government departments
[Vol. 8: p. 161
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the Board are known as the ADA Accessibility Guidelines
("ADAAG") and include recommendations for implementing Title
III.25
A. Department of Justice Regulations
In the construction of sports stadiums two specific guidelines
adopted by the DOJ are applicable. The first regulation determines
the number of wheelchair locations that an arena must contain in
an "assembly arena."2 6 Under this regulation, if all designated
wheelchair spaces are not sold out, folding chairs may be put in
those spaces for spectators who wish to purchase a ticket. 27 This
regulation has not been a source of controversy.
The second regulation, Standard 4.33.3, however, deals with
the placement of wheelchair locations and is a source of disagree-
ment.28 First, this section requires that wheelchair locations have
or agencies. See id. The Board's overall mission is the elimination of architectural,
transportation, communication, and attitudinal barriers confronting people with
disabilities. See id. § 792(b). The ADA directed the Board to promulgate "mini-
mum guidelines" to supplement previous existing Minimum Guidelines and Re-
quirements for Accessible Design "to ensure that buildings, facilities, rail passenger
cars, and vehicles are accessible . . . to individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12204(a)-(b). The deadline for these regulations was April 26, 1991. See id. (stat-
ing date for regulation). Based on the ADA's legislative history, the DOJ's stan-
dards may incorporate these guidelines. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 119
(1990).
25. See Standards, supra note 19, at App. A. (stating that "[t]hese guidelines
are to be applied during the design, construction, and alteration of ... buildings
and facilities"). The design standards promulgated by the Attorney General are
known as "Standards." See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698,
708 (D. Or. 1997) (noting that "design standards enacted by the Attorney General
are identical to the ADAAGs, but are denominated as 'Standards'."). Despite the
name difference in the board regulations and the DOJ's regulations, these stan-
dards are used "interchangeably." See id.
26. Standards, supra note 19, at App. A. This rule is known as the "one per-
cent plus one" rule and requires that when the seating capacity of an arena ex-
ceeds 500 persons, six wheelchair locations plus one additional space for every 100
seats above 500 is required. Id. This means the total number of wheelchair loca-
tions must equal one-percent of the total seating capacity plus one more location,
as long as seating capacity exceeds 500. See id. Additionally, no less than one per-
cent "of all fixed seats shall be aisle seats with no armrests on the aisle side, or
removable or folding armrests on the aisle side." Id.
27. See Standards, supra note 19, at App. A (stating, "Readily removable seats
may be installed in wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to accom-
modate wheelchair users."); see also U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, ACCESSIBLE STADIUMS 1
(1996) (stating that "[r]emovable or folding seats can be provided in wheelchair
seating locations for use by persons who do not use wheelchairs so the facility does
not lose revenue when not all wheelchair seating locations are ticketed to persons
who use wheelchairs."); Fritts, supra note 2, at 2656 (stating that folding seats may
be provided in stadiums).
28. See Standards, supra note 19, at App. A. Standard 4.33.3 states:
2001]
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"lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general pub-
lic."29 Second, wheelchair locations must "be an integral part of
any fixed seating plan."30 Third, the dispersal requirement man-
dates that "when the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair
spaces shall be provided in more than one location." 3'
B. The Board's Recommendations
In formulating minimum guidelines for Title III, the Board
solicited comments on whether an "enhanced" line of sight, one
that gave a "full line of sight over standing spectators in sports are-
nas," should be required, or if a "general" line of sight, one based
on a seated position, was enough. 32 When the Board published its
final guidelines, however, it deferred its issuance of an opinion on
"enhanced" lines of sight until a later date.3 3 Because the Board
issued its final guidelines on the day the Justice Department's final
regulations were due, the DOJ adopted virtually all the Board's
Wheelchair locations shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan
and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a
choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public. They shall adjoin an accessible route that
also serves as a means of egress in case of emergency. At least one com-
panion fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheelchair seating area.
When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be pro-
vided in more than one location. Readily removable seats may be in-
stalled in wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to
accommodate wheelchair users.
Id.
29. Id. The phrase "lines of sight comparable" is the main source of contro-
versy regarding Title III because of the disagreement whether the DOJ actually
adopted the Board's enhanced line of sight standard. Id.; see also Fritts, supra note
2, at 2657 (noting first requirement of Standard 4.33.3).
30. Id. This requirement is designed to prohibit a seating plan that creates
.vast wasteland within which one or two isolated wheelchair patrons will be seated."
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. 393,
402 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Fritts, supra note 2, at 2657 (noting second requirement
of Section 4.33.3).
31. Standards, supra note 19, at App. A. The dispersal requirement allows
wheelchair patrons to choose among seat locations and ticket prices. See Ellerbe
Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. at 404 (explaining that "[d] ispersal requires
a choice of various seating areas, good and bad, expensive and inexpensive, which
generally match those of ambulatory spectators."); see also Fritts, supra note 2, at
2657 (discussing third requirement of Section 4.33.3).
32. Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 15, at 2314.
33. Id. at 35,440 (stating that "many commentators ... recommended that
lines of sight should be provided over standing spectators .... The issue of lines
of sight over standing spectators will be addressed in guidelines for recreational
facilities."). These comments were published on July 26, 1991, three months after
the statutory deadline. See id.
[Vol. 8: p. 161
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guidelines in its final regulations. 34 When the DOJ wrote its com-
mentary on the regulations, it made no reference to the issue of an
enhanced line of sight standard.35 The Board then later published
an "enhanced" line of sight guideline, which resulted in an incon-
sistency between the Board's recommendations and the final DOJ
regulations.3 6
C. TAM Supplement
In order to assist with compliance under Title III of the ADA,
Congress required that the DOJ issue technical manuals.37 Prior to
the 1994 Technical Assistance Manual ("TAM Supplement"), the
Technical Assistance Manual for Title III did not address the issue
of lines of sight over standing spectators.38 As a result, a definite
view on the "lines of sight comparable" requirement did not exist.39
This subsequently caused confusion for stadium owners.40
The TAM Supplement was the first official interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3.41 The TAM Supplement explicitly stated that
34. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommoda-
tions and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544 (July 26, 1991) (to be codi-
fied at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (discussing reason why DOJ's and Board's regulation are
identical); see also Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 739-40
(D. Or. 1997) (same); see also Fritts, supra note 2, at 2656 (same).
35. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 581 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (explaining that DOJ made no reference to enhanced sightlines); see also
Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 740 (same). The DOJ did not expressly adopt
the Board's commentary, but it simply recommended "lines of sight comparable to
those available to the rest of the public," failing to mention the issue of standing
spectators. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 581 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 35, 408, 35,440
(1991)).
36. See Accessibility Guidelines, supra note 15, at 34,440 (explaining that
Board's "enhanced" line of sight guideline came out three months after DOJ regu-
lations were published).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c) (3).
38. See D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 587; see also U.S. DEP'T. oF JUSTICE, THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACr TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANuAL 13 (Supp.
1994) [hereinafter "TAM Supplement"] (noting that prior manual did not discuss
lines of sight issue). Between July 1991, when the DOJ regulations were issued,
and December 1994, when the TAM Supplement was issued, the DOJ never offi-
cially interpreted Standard 4.33.3. SeeD.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 587 (concluding that
Department "never authoritatively adopted a position contrary" to 1994 TAM
Supplement).
39. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 581-82 (recognizing unresolved issue of compara-
ble lines of sight).
40. See Fritts, supra note 2, at 2657 (noting confusion for stadium owners and
operators when deciphering which line of sight was required).
41. See id. The prior Title III Technical Assistance Manual did not address the
enhanced line of sight issue. See also D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 581-82. The 1994
TAM Supplement was issued after two and a half years of informal interpretation.
See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 737 (D. Or. 1997)
(discussing speech by Irene Bowen, deputy chief of Public Access Section of De-
2001] 167
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wheelchair locations must have lines of sight over standing specta-
tors.42 The technical manuals required under Title III of the ADA
are intended to assist architects in designing and building new are-
nas.43 The source of controversy surrounding the TAM Supple-
ment concerns whether it is a valid interpretation of a pre-existing
regulation or whether the Supplement was an attempt by the DOJ
to issue a new regulation. 44
Stadium operators contend that the TAM Supplement created
a "line of sight" requirement that previously did not exist.4 5 As evi-
dence of their position, stadium operators cite numerous conflict-
ing DOJ interpretations of the line of sight requirement.46
partment ofJustice, to Major League Baseball Stadium operators, which stated that
Department did not interpret Standard 4.33.3 to require lines of sight over stand-
ing spectators). D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 581-82 (same); see also Indep. Living Res.,
982 F. Supp. at 750-51 (discussing justice Department's notification to representa-
tives of Atlanta Committee on Olympic Games that lines of sight over standing
spectators was required at newly constructed Olympic stadiums); Indep. Living Res.,
982 F. Supp. at 753 n.71 (discussing letters sent out by DOJ during 1993 and 1994
advising stadium operators that lines of sight over standing spectators were re-
quired); Fritts, supra note 2, at 2657 (discussing Irene Bowen's speech regarding
Standard 4.33.3).
42. See TAM Supplement, supra note 38, at 13. Two years after issuing the
TAM Supplement, the DOJ issued a memorandum, which explained in detail the
line of sight requirement stating:
In stadiums where spectators can be expected to stand during the show
or event (for example, football, baseball, basketball games, or rock con-
certs), all or substantially all of the wheelchair seating locations must pro-
vide a line of sight over standing spectators. A comparable line of
sight . . . allows a person using a wheelchair to see the playing surface
between the heads and over the shoulder of the persons standing in the
row immediately in front and over the heads of the persons standing two
rows in front.
Fritts, supra note 2, at 2658 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ACCESSIBLE STADIUMS 1
(1996)). Because this DOJ memorandum qualifies the interpretation of the en-
hanced line of sight standard by requiring "all or substantially all" wheelchair loca-
tions to have a line of sight over standing spectators, it has been a source of
litigation in courts. See id. at 2656.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c) (3). These manuals are not supposed to be used
as a substitute for notice under the Federal Register. See id.
44. See Fritts, supra note 2, at 2661 (noting cases discussing whether TAM Sup-
plement should be classified as interpretive rule).
45. Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 736. The court noted that it does not
matter that this is the DOJ's first public interpretation of Standard 4.33.3. See id. at
735 (noting that enhanced line of sight standard either previously existed or did
not exist at all). If the "line of sight" requirement did not previously exist, the DOJ
could only create such a requirement "through a legislative regulation promul-
gated in accordance with the procedures established in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (hereinafter "APA")." Id. at 735; cf NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 290-95 (1974) (discussing circumstances under which agency may announce
new rule by adjudication).
46. Compare Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 737 (discussing speech by Irene
Bowen, deputy chief of Public Access Section of Department of Justice, to Major
[Vol. 8: p. 161
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Therefore, it is argued that because the DOJ has issued inconsistent
statements regarding Standard 4.33.3 that the TAM Supplement is
an attempt by the DOJ to issue a new substantive regulation without
notice and comment.47
D. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") exempts "interpre-
tive rules" but not "substantive rules" from notice and comment re-
quirements. 48  Interpretive rules are statements "issued by an
agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the...
rules which it administers. '49 Substantive rules, however, "grant
rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects on
the private interests."50 Because the TAM Supplement "was not is-
sued pursuant to notice and comment procedures, its interpreta-
tion of Standard 4.33.3 must be classified as an interpretive rule" to
survive an APA challenge. 51
League Baseball Stadium operators which stated that the Department did not in-
terpret Standard 4.33 to require lines of sight over standing spectators), with Indep.
Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 750-51 (discussing Justice Department's notification to
representatives of Atlanta Committee on Olympic Games that lines of sight over
standing spectators are required at newly constructed Olympic stadiums); see also
Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 753 n.71 (discussing letters sent out by DOJ
during 1993 and 1994 advising stadium operators that lines of sight over standing
spectators were required).
47. See id. at 735-36. Whether the TAM Supplement is a substantive regula-
tion depends on whether the DOJ formally and publicly adopted a contrary inter-
pretation of Standard 4.33.3. See id. at 737.
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (1994). Notice and comment procedures re-
quire an agency to: (1) publish in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rule
making; (2) afford interested parties an opportunity to submit written comments
on the proposed rule; and (3) respond to the comments to some degree in a
statement of basis and purpose issued with the final rule. See id. § 553(b)-(c).
49. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); see also United
States v. Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp., 111 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (same);
Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (defining substantive and interpretative rules from Att'y Gen.'s Manual on
APA). These rules "merely clarify or explain existing.., regulations." Fed. Labor
Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't. of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 762 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992); see
also Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993);
Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d
694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir 1980)). A rule is not a substantive right because it may have
a substantive impact. See id. at 1046 (citing Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Pos-
tal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
51. Fritts, supra note 2, at 2660; see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C.
Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 587-88 (D.C. Cir 1997) (rejecting APA challenge because
manual's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 was found to be an interpretive rule).
This was because of the proposition that when an agency substantially departs from
its previous interpretation of a regulation, the action is paramount to an amend-
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Many argue that the TAM Supplement is an interpretive rule
and that Standard 4.33.3 may be enforced without notice or com-
ment.52 In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena,53 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
plained that in determining whether a rule is substantive or inter-
pretive it is necessary to examine "how tightly the agency's
interpretation is drawn linguistically from the actual language of
Standard 4.33.3."54 The court concluded that this should be classi-
fied as an interpretive rule because the DOJ based its interpretation
upon the "lines of sight comparable" language in Standard 4.33.3.55
Further, the court stated that "the government arguably could have
relied on the regulation itself, even without the manual interpreta-
tion, to seek lines of sight over standing spectators."5 6
III. COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE DOJ's REGULATION
A. Courts Requiring Lines of Sight Over Standing Spectators
1. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena
In 1996 an organization of disabled veterans and individual
wheelchair users filed a suit against the builders of the MCI Arena
in Washington, D.C. alleging that the seating in the arena failed to
provide the number of accessible wheelchair locations required by
the ADA.57 Although the court gave deference to the DOJ's 1994
TAM interpretation of enhanced sightlines for wheelchair patrons,
the court criticized the government for not giving a more explicit
ment of a rule and requires notice and comment. See Nat'l Family Planning &
Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
52. See Fritts, supra note 2, at 2660 (stating that "TAM supplement should be
classified as an interpretive rule because it offers a cogent explanation of the term
'lines of sight' comparable which Standard 4.33.3 fails to define.").
53. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 588.
55. Id.
56. Id. Earlier courts concluded that the narrower a rule is interpreted, the
less notice the court affords parties of an agency's position. See Am. Mining Cong.
v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (C.A.D.C. 1993). Further,
these courts held that if every official interpretation were required to go through
notice and comment procedures, agencies would simply let the regulatory inter-
pretation evolve during the enforcement process. See id.
57. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F.
Supp. 393, 396-97 (D.D.C. 1996). The defendants filed a summaryjudgment mo-
tion in October 1996, and the court granted deference to the DOJ's 1994 TAM
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, requiring enhanced lines of sight. See id. More-
over, the court made this ruling despite recognizing the "good faith" of the de-
fendants in the construction and design of the MCI Center. Id. at 398.
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interpretation. 58 Further, the district court held that the arena, as
designed, failed to provide a sufficient number of wheelchair spaces
with lines of sight over standing spectators. 59 Moreover, the court
determined the arena failed to disperse adequately wheelchair
spaces throughout the seating bowl.60 The court stated that full
compliance with these elements was not necessary based upon the
DOJ's ambiguous interpretation of the Standard. 61 Therefore, the
court concluded that the defendants did violate Standard 4.33.3,
but it did not require every seat to provide enhanced sightlines. 62
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
DOJ's interpretation of guidelines requiring enhanced lines of
sight for wheelchair patrons should be given deference. 63 This
court based its ruling on the conclusion that the DOJ's interpreta-
tion of its own regulation was not sufficiently distinct from its regu-
lation as to require notice and comment. 64 Because the DOJ never
authoritatively adopted a position contrary to the TAM interpreta-
tion, the court concluded that the TAM constituted a permissible
interpretation of the regulation. 65 Additionally, the circuit court
58. See Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. at 399. The court com-
mented that "[t ] he Justice Department has not established a clear record of ex-
actly what its interpretation requires. With the exception of a single, general
diagram in a 1996 'Accessible Stadiums' release [regarding the Atlanta Olympic
stadium], the Department has not defined or documented the technical specifica-
tions for compliance." Id.
59. See id. at 405 (noting that less than forty percent of wheelchair spaces in
MCI Arena have unobstructed line of sight when patrons stand).
60. See id. The court noted that almost all wheelchair seats in the MCI Arena
are located in the end zone area. See id. While the court addressed a few proposed
remedies for the violation, the court concluded it was up to the defendants to
design alterations for the stadium so substantial seating would comply with the
dispersal and line of sight requirement. See id. at 405.
61. See id. at 401 (stating that "[t]he Court is unable and unwilling to poke
through the myriad of announcements, press releases, and threatened legal ac-
tions and to extract specific, technical standards" where Justice Department has
adopted a flexible approach). The court noted that the DOJ has never interpreted
Standard 4.33.3 to require 100 percent of seating to require enhanced guidelines.
See id. Based on the Olympic Stadium model, which the DOJ calls "the most acces-
sible stadium in the world" and uses as "the model for all future stadiums," the
court concluded that a facility is in compliance with the ADA if a substantial per-
centage of seats provide enhanced sightlines. Id. at 400.
62. See id. at 401. The court declared that substantial compliance is all that is
required. See id. The court noted that by looking at the stadium designs, the num-
ber of seats in compliance were not substantial but could be modified with "mod-
erate changes to achieve compliance." Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp.
at 401.
63. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 587.
2001]
11
Kurack: Standing in Front of the Disabled: Judicial Uncertainty over Enha
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
172 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 8: p. 161
held that the interpretation was not a substantive rule, because even
without the TAM interpretation, the government could have relied
solely on the regulation to seek lines of sight over standing
spectators. 66
The opinion, written by Judge Silberman, discussed the mean-
ing of "lines of sight" and the level of deference to be given to the
DOJ's interpretation. 67 The court began by noting that the phrase
"lines of sight comparable" may be interpreted reasonably as a view
for wheelchair users that is comparable to non-wheelchair users. 68
The court, however, noticed the ambiguity in the statute as to
whether the phrase "lines of sight comparable" refers to permanent
obstructions or those caused temporarily by standing spectators. 69
Because the phrase is ambiguous, the court concluded the DOJ's
interpretation should be given substantial deference.70
In the next portion of the opinion, the court stated the general
rule of giving deference to an agency's interpretation of its regula-
tions unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the regula-
tion.71 The defendants argued that the Supreme Court should
abandon deference to agency interpretation of regulations due to
the fact that it creates incentives to draft vague regulations. 72 The
court rejected this argument and stated that there is an outer limit
to the deference imposed by the APA, which protects against draft-
66. See id. at 583.
67. See id. The stadium operators presented three specific arguments. See id.
First, the stadium operator argued that "the language of the regulation will not
bear" the enhanced lines of sight interpretation. Id. Second, even if the regula-
tion is ambiguous, appellants argued that the appellate court should construct its
own interpretation of the regulation instead of granting deference to the DOJ's
interpretation. See id. (asking court to "approach the task of interpretation with
fresh eyes"). Third, appellants argued that the DOJ never adopted the Board's
enhanced line of sight standard. See id.
68. See D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 582. Appellants argued that the phrase "lines
of sight comparable" only requires wheelchair areas to be dispersed throughout a
facility. See id. Further, appellants argued that the phrase "lines of sight compara-
ble" had a specific meaning limited to permanent obstructions. Id. The court
rejected this argument, however, and concluded that there was no uniformly un-
derstood construction of the language prior to the time it was picked up by the
Board and the Department. See id. Because the words "had not taken on a well-
understood meaning" this phrase had not developed "a universally accepted lin-
guistic meaning contrary to the one [DOJ] assert[ed]." Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 584.
71. Id.; see, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)
(explaining rule); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(same).
72. See D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 584 (citing John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 612 (1996)).
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ing ambiguous regulations.73 The court said it believed the regula-
tion had sufficient content.74 Additionally, the DOJ's drafting of
the regulation had no bearing on whether the interpretation
should be granted deference. 75
Next, the court discussed appellants most compelling argu-
ment, namely "that the DOJ's present interpretation of the regula-
tion constitute [d] a fundamental modification of its previous
interpretation" and that the DOJ "cannot switch its position merely
by revising a manual. '76 The court rejected the government's argu-
ment that an agency may "change its interpretation of an ambigu-
ous regulation so long as the regulation reasonably will bear the
second interpretation." 77 The court concluded that the DOJ did
not clearly adopt a position contrary to its manual interpretation,
and therefore, the TAM was a permissible interpretation of the
regulation. 78
73. See id. To avoid the vagueness concern, substantive regulations "must
have sufficient content and definiteness to be a meaningful exercise of agency
lawmaking." Id. Further, the court stated that "[i]t is certainly not open to an
agency to promulgate mush and then give it concrete form only through subse-
quent less formal 'interpretations."' Id.
74. See id. The court believed the regulation provided accurate notice be-
cause those who operated stadiums should have believed the phrase "lines of sight
comparable" may "imply an unobstructed view over standing spectators." Id. at
585.
75. See id. The court noted that deference is given to a regulation because the
agency is the sponsor of the regulation, not because it is the drafter of the regula-
tion. See id. (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110, 112 (1992)); see also
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 F.3d 842, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1171 (explaining why deference is given to regulation). Because the
Board's regulation was adopted by the DOJ, it became the DOJ's responsibility to
enforce it. See id. (noting that regulation was "the Justice Department's and only
the Justice Department's responsibility.").
76. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 586. As a general rule, once an agency issues an
interpretation of a regulation it can only modify the regulation through the pro-
cess of notice and comment. See id.
77. Id. The court noted that the APA specifically states that agencies must
engage in notice and comment procedures before formulating "repeals" or
"amendments" to regulations. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)). If an agency alters its
interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment, the APA
regulations would be undermined. See id. (interpreting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995)) (noting that Supreme Court has stated in dicta
that APA requires interpretation to "adopt a new position inconsistent with ...
existing regulations.").
78. See id. at 587. The court noted that in the Board's notice of proposed
rule-making it stated that the guidelines "may not be sufficient in sports arenas or
race tracks where the audience frequently stands." Id. at 586. The Board also
"solicited comments on 'whether full lines of sight over standing spectators . . .
should be required,' and in promulgating the final rule the Board acknowledged
that '[m]any commentators . . . recommended that lines of sight should be pro-
vided over standing spectators' which implies that the Board did not believe its
guidelines alleviated their concern." Id. (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,440).
2001]
13
Kurack: Standing in Front of the Disabled: Judicial Uncertainty over Enha
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
174 VILLANOVA SPORTS & Er. LAW JOURNAL
2. United States v. Ellerbe Becket
The Minnesota District Court addressed the validity of the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation of the enhanced line of sight stan-
dard in United States v. Ellerbe Becket. 79 The government filed a suit
against the architectural firm Ellerbe Becket, Inc., alleging a pat-
tern of designing sports arenas across the United States that failed
to comply with ADA standards. 80 The court held that the DOJ's
interpretation of enhanced lines of sight at sports facilities was an
interpretive rule entitled to deference. 8 1
After concluding that architects were subject to liability under
the ADA, the court considered the issue of the line of sight require-
ment.8 2 The court relied primarily on the D.C. Circuit's finding in
D.C. Arena that the TAM Supplement was not a substantive rule re-
quiring notice and comment under the APA.83 Although the court
acknowledged that the Third Circuit had a different view, it indi-
cated that it found the D.C. Circuit's opinion to be more
persuasive. 84
B. Cases That Do Not Require Patrons to Have
Enhanced Sightlines
1. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Centre
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of
whether enhanced lines of sight were required at the Blockbuster-
Sony Music Entertainment Centre ("E-Centre") in Caruso v. Block-
79. 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997).
80. See id. at 1264. Ellerbe was not the owner or operator of any of the stadi-
ums named in the complaint. See id. at 1266. Ellerbe, however, did design each of
the five arenas contained "in the Complaint for a different owner." Id.
Specifically the government argued that the arenas and stadiums constructed
by the defendant did "not provide wheelchair users with lines of sight to the floor
or field comparable to those enjoyed by non-disabled spectators." Id. The govern-
ment contended that the line of sight for patrons in wheelchairs was not compara-
ble to ambulatory patrons "because they [did] not allow patrons in wheelchairs to
see the facility's floor when other patrons st[oo]d." Id. The government sought
an injunction compelling Ellerbe to comply with the requirements of the ADA in
designing arenas and stadiums in the future. Id.
81. See id. at 1262. The court also held that architects are subject to liability
under the ADA. See id. The court, however, noted that substantial compliance
with Title III of the ADA was sufficient to avoid liability. See id.
82. See id. at 1268.
83. See id. at 1269 (following approach from D.C. Arena).
84. See Ellerbe Becket, 976 F. Supp. at 1269 (acknowledging alternative view of
Third Circuit in Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 210
(D.N.J. 1997)).
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buster-Sony Music Entertainment Centre.85 This action was brought by a
Vietnam veteran who filed a complaint asserting, inter alia, that the
E-Centre was operated in violation of Title III of the ADA, because
the wheelchair areas in the pavilion did not provide wheelchair
users with lines of sight over standing spectators.8 6
The court first examined whether DOJ Standard 4.33.3 re-
quires the operators of the E-Centre to provide wheelchair users
with lines of sight over standing spectators. 87 Caruso argued that
the phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public" should be given its plain meaning and require
wheelchair users to "be able to see the stage when other patrons
stand. '88 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that Standard
4.33.3 should be read in its context with the two other provisions
concerning the dispersal of wheelchair locations in arenas with
fixed seating plans.89 When interpreted in the context of the other
provisions included in Standard 4.33.3, the phrase "lines of sight
comparable" may also be read to require that when members of the
85. 174 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1999). The E-Centre is located in Camden, New
Jersey. See id. at 168. The interior pavilion of the E-Centre provides fixed seating
for 6200 patrons and the uncovered lawn area accommodates approximately
18,000 spectators who may either sit or stand. See id.
86. See id. Caruso, who uses a wheelchair due to his disability "attended a
concert at the E-Centre on July 13, 1995." Id. at 169. Additionally, the Advocates
for Disabled Americans joined as plaintiffs in this case. See id. The plaintiffs as-
serted that the E-Centre violated Title III of the ADA because "the lawn area [was]
not wheelchair accessible." Id.
87. See id. (noting "Placement of Wheelchair Locations" as stated in Standard
4.33.3).
88. Id. (quoting PVA Reply Br. at 23).
89. See id. at 169-70. Appellants conceded that the provisions in Standard
4.33.3 requiring a "choice of admission prices" and "more than one location" when
"the seating capacity exceeds 300" concerned the dispersal of wheelchair areas
throughout an arena. Id. at 170 n.3. Appellants, however, rejected any suggestion
that the lines of sight requirement might require dispersal and not vertical en-
hancement. See id. The appellants argued:
Standard 4.33.3 ... contains an explicit dispersal provision, wholly inde-
pendent of the "comparable" line of sight provision. It requires, in perti-
nent part that "[w]heelchair areas ... shall be provided so as to provide
persons with disabilities a choice of admission prices." For facilities, such
as modern sports and entertainment venues, that offer tickets at a range
of prices depending on seating location, dispersal of wheelchair locations
is required by this provision. Moreover, a requirement for dispersal is
also derived from the language in Standard 4.33.3 that "[w]hen the seat-
ing capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be provided at more
than one location." Construing the phrase "lines of sight comparable to
those provided to members of the general public" as simply requiring
dispersal of wheelchair locations, as the E-Centre urges, is contrary to the
plain language of that regulation and would deprive important parts of
the regulation of any meaning.
Id. (quoting PVA Reply Br. at 6-7).
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general public are provided with different lines of sight to the field
or stage, wheelchair users must also be given a comparable oppor-
tunity to view the field or stage from a variety of angles.90 Because
both interpretations were plausible, the court ruled that Standard
4.33.3 was ambiguous. 91
After concluding that Standard 4.33.3 was ambiguous, the
court examined whether it should defer to the interpretation given
to the rule by the DOJ. 9 2 To determine whether to give deference
to the DOJ's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, the court was forced
to decide whether the interpretation was an interpretive rule or a
new substantive requirement.93 After examining the history of
Standard 4.33.3, the court concluded that the 1994 TAM supple-
ment constituted a fundamental change in interpretation that
could only be made by adopting a substantive rule pursuant to no-
tice and comment.94 Because the DOJ did not follow the notice
and comment procedure, the Third Circuit concluded that the E-
90. See Caruso, 174 F.3d at 170 n.4 (stating that additional reason for not
clearly requiring sightlines over standing spectators might be that because Stan-
dard 4.33.3 concerns seating plans and seating arenas, drafters may have assumed
regulations should only affect seated spectators and not standing patrons).
91. See id. at 171. The court concluded that appellants' reading of 4.33.3 was
plausible because it would benefit wheelchair users by allowing them to see when
other patrons stand. See id. The E-Centre interpretation, however, was also valid
because it would benefit wheelchair users by providing them with a greater oppor-
tunity to see a performance or event from different angles. See id.
92. See id. (discussing appellants' contention that court should give DOJ's in-
terpretation deference).
93. See id. (noting appellants' and appellees' positions regarding whether rule
is interpretive or substantive). If the rule is an interpretive rule, the court noted
that the DOJ's interpretation should be given deference. See id. If the rule, how-
ever, is a substantive rule, the rule is subject to the notice and comment require-
ments of the APA. See id.
94. See id. (describing history of sightlines issue). Instead of concluding that
the DOJ consciously ignored the issue raised in the Board's notice of proposed
rulemaking and debated by commentators, the court concluded that the DOJ im-
plicitly adopted the Board's analysis of Standard 4.33.3. See id. at 175. The factors
supporting this conclusion included:
1) the DOJ referred all comments to the Board; 2) the DOJ relied on the
Board to make adequate changes based on those comments; 3) the Board
specifically changed the language of 4.33.3 in response to comments and
explained that change in its commentary; 4) the DOJ was a "member of
the Board" and "participated actively.., in preparation of both the pro-
posed and final versions of the [guidelines]; and 5) the DOJ's commen-
tary stated that the final guidelines promulgated by the Board adequately
addressed all comments.
Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt 36, App. B at 632) (citing Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena
Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 741 (D. Or. 1997)).
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Centre did not violate Tide III of the ADA by failing to provide
wheelchair users with sighlines over standing spectators. 95
Finally, the court discussed in detail its disagreement with the
D.C. Circuit's decision in D.C. Arena.96 This disagreement sur-
rounded the issue of whether the DOJ promulgated an ambiguous
rule, and the Third Circuit tried to resolve the ambiguity through
an interpretive rule.97 The court noted that the D.C. Circuit relied
on the fact the defendant in that case did not argue that Standard
4.33.3 was vague. 98 Consequently, the court distinguished this case
from the D.C. Circuit's ruling.99 The Third Circuit, however,
agreed with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that "an agency is com-
pletely free to change its interpretation of an ambiguous regulation
so long as the regulation reasonably will bear the second
interpretation."'1 00
95. See Caruso, 174 F.3d at 177. The court concluded that if the DOJ believed
the ADA should be interpreted to require wheelchair users to have sightlines over
standing spectators, the DOJ could accomplish this through notice and comment
procedures. See id. The court noted that the DOJ probably could have achieved
this interpretation by now if it would have followed notice and comment proce-
dures earlier. See id.
96. See id. at 174-77 (discussing differences in opinion between D.C. Circuit
and Third Circuit).
97. See id. at 174 (noting that D.C. Arena court ruled that DOJ's promulgation
of Standard 4.33.3 did not violate this principle). The D.C. Arena court discussed
this principle stating that "[i]t is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate
mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal 'inter-
pretations.' That technique would circumvent section 553, the notice and com-
ment procedures of the APA." Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d
579, 584 (D.C. 1997).
98. See Caruso, 174 F.3d at 175 n.7 (discussing E-Centre's argument that
"DOJ's rule would be impermissibly vague on the issue of sightlines if the Access
Board's commentary were not attributed to the DOJ.") (quoting Appellees' Br. at
33).
99. See id. at 176 (noting differences between D.C. Arena and Caruso).
100. Id. at 175 (citing D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d at 586). The appellants contended
that the Third Circuit should not follow the view of the D.C. Circuit because it is
contrary to cases allowing agencies to change the interpretation of their regula-
tion. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (allowing
agency to change interpretation of its regulation); C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Beazer East v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603
(3d Cir. 1992) (same). The court distinguished Thomas Jefferson because the incon-
sistency in that case "did not involve a 'fundamental change' of a prior interpreta-
tion that had general applicability, but rather, an agency's adoption of a position
that was arguably inconsistent with some past actions taken by the Secretary in
individual cases." See Caruso, 174 F.3d at 175 (citing Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at
517). The court distinguished C.K because, like Thomas Jefferson, "it did not ad-
dress the situation where an agency publicly announces one interpretation of a
regulation that will presumably be applied to all covered parties and then attempts
to change its regulation." Id. Finally the court distinguished Beazer East for two
reasons. See id. First, Beazer East involved agency adjudication, which is guided by
different principles than agency rule-making. See id. (citing BeazerEast, 963 F.2d at
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2. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp.
The Oregon District Court addressed the issue of whether en-
hanced lines of sight were required at the Rose Garden Arena in
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp.101 A disabled attor-
ney and a non-profit advocacy organization for the disabled
brought this action against the owner and operator of the Rose Gar-
den Arena.10 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the arena engaged in dis-
criminatory practices in violation of Title III of the ADA due to the
location of wheelchair spaces and lack of adequate lines of sight to
view the action in the arena) 0 3 Both parties sought, inter alia, sum-
mary judgment as to the issues in dispute.10 4
First, the court addressed the plaintiffs' argument that al-
though there are 191 wheelchair spaces at the Rose Garden, most
of those spaces are concentrated in the upper levels.10 5 The court
ruled that the placement of 191 wheelchair spaces in the arena vio-
lated the dispersal requirement of the ADA because these seats
were concentrated in the upper level of the arena.10 6 The court
concluded that without this dispersal requirement a stadium opera-
609). Second, although BeazerEast stated "that agencies could adopt or revise their
substantive rules in adjudication, it made clear that it was not dealing with a situa-
tion where 'the agency inconsistency interpreted a standard over time or changed
its interpretation.'" Id. (quoting Beazer East, 963 F.2d at 610).
101. 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or 1997). The Rose Garden is the home arena of
the NBA basketball team, the Portland Trailblazers, and the Western Hockey
League team, the Portland Winter Hawks. See id. at 706. Additionally, the arena is
used for other events such as ice shows, concerts, soccer, indoor football and the
circus. See id.
102. See id. Independent Living Resources is a non-profit corporation "organ-
ized ... for the purpose of promoting the rights and needs of persons with disabili-
ties for full inclusion and equal access in all aspects of life and providing
education, training, and independent living services to persons with disabilities."
Id. The defendant was the Oregon Arena Corporation, a private company that
constructed, owns, and operates the Rose Garden. See id.
103. See id. Since the Rose Garden was constructed for first occupancy after
January 26, 1993 and the last building permit was certified after January 26, 1992,
the Rose Garden is subject to the rules regarding "new construction." See id. (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)).
104. See id. (detailing numerous motions before court).
105. See id. at 708 (noting that both parties agreed that there were 191 wheel-
chair spaces designed at Rose Garden). Plaintiffs, however, argued that these
spaces were "improperly concentrated in 'wheelchair ghettos' in comparatively un-
desirable locations of the arena." Id.
106. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 715 (noting "that 124 of the Rose
Garden's 191 wheelchair spaces - or 65 percent - [were] located in the corners of
the endzone"). The court also concluded that seventeen percent of the wheel-
chair spaces were located on level seven. See id. Taken together these made up
more than eighty-two percent of the wheelchair locations. See id. at 708. Because
level seven was not an integral part of the Rose Garden's seating plan, the dispersal
of thirty-three wheelchair spaces in that area violated the ADA's requirements. See
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tor could designate a few wheelchair seats in a better seating area
and cluster the rest of the seats in an undesirable location.' 0 7 Al-
though absolute homogeneity is not required in the arena, the
court stated that stadium operators "may not relegate wheelchair
users to the dark corners of the arena."108
After determining that defendants had violated the dispersal
requirement of the ADA, the court examined whether defendants
were in compliance with the "one percent plus one" requirement
set forth in Standard 4.13. Once the court subtracted the excess
spaces in level seven, the court concluded that the arena violated
the "one percent plus one rule."10 9 The court determined that the
sole reason for placing the extra seats on level seven was so that the
arena could be in compliance with the "one percent plus one
rule. "110
Along with the dispersal requirement of Tide III, the district
court discussed the issue of sighflines over standing spectators.111
The court divided this topic into three issues. First, the court
looked at whether the DOJ could require that wheelchair users be
provided with a line of sight over standing spectators. 112 Second,
the court examined whether such a requirement for lines of sight
would be binding on the defendant.1 3 Third, the court inquired
whether there is any defense to the requirement of providing lines
of sight over standing spectators.' 1 4
id. at 712 (noting that level seven is isolated from main seating bowl, and primarily
used for mechanical equipment and to seat overflow of press reporters).
107. See id. at 709 (noting that this action was contrary to congressional intent
of Title III of ADA).
108. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the ADA require-
ments for seat dispersement were satisfied as long as an unspecified number of
seats are made available in each price category. See id. (stating that "in large assem-
bly arenas wheelchair spaces must be an integral part of the seating plan and be
dispersed so as to provide wheelchair users with a choice of sightlines and ticket
prices comparable to those available to the general public.").
109. See id. at 714. The court subtracted exactly thirty-three spaces from level
seven because they were in excess of the dispersal requirement. See id.
110. See id. at 713. The court cited the testimony of defendant's Senior Pro-ject Manager, Bob Collier, who testified that "defendant was not concerned with
what representatives of the disabled community wanted, but was concerned only
with satisfying the minimum requirements of the ADA." Id. at 714.
111. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 732 (noting DOJ's interpretation of
Standard 4.33 to require lines of sight comparable to general public).
112. See id. at 732-34 (noting that objective of Title III was to provide disabled
person experience equivalent to that of other patrons).
113. See id. at 734-36 (discussing whether DOJ's interpretation was valid or
invalid attempt to promulgate new regulation).
114. See id. at 747-55 (identifying and articulating any possible defenses).
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In response to the first issue, the court observed that the DOJ
could have reasonably concluded that lines of sight over standing
spectators are necessary.'1 5 The court noted that many ADA re-
quirements may be facially neutral but may have a disparate impact
among wheelchair users. 116 Additionally, the court stated that the
ADA had adequate legal authority to support such a
requirement. 17
Next, the court examined whether a requirement for lines of
sight did exist and whether it was binding upon the defendant." 8
The court noted that both courts that have considered the case
have been split on the issue. 119 Each court found that the central
issue was whether the TAM supplement was a valid interpretive reg-
ulation or an invalid attempt to promulgate a new legislative regula-
tion. 120 Although the Independent Living Resources court followed
the Caruso court's interpretation, it did not consider that the date
on which construction of the Rose Garden commenced occurred
before the TAM supplement was released.' 21 Instead, the court an-
115. See id. at 734.
116. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 734. The court found that if the
ADA only required public accommodations to provide physically identical facilities
for wheelchair patrons and non-disabled patrons, "there would be no need to pro-
vide ramps and elevators; both groups would be given an 'equal opportunity' to
use the stairs." Id. at 733.
117. See id. at 733. The court recognized that the ADA requires more than
refraining from active discrimination; it further requires stadium operators to take
affirmative steps to ensure that a disabled patron is accommodated. See H.R. RP.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 104 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 267, 387. The
objective of Title III is to provide individuals with disabilities an opportunity func-
tionally equivalent to other non-disabled patrons. See Standards, supra note 19,
§§ 36.202, 36.203, 36.302.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that this constituted preferential
treatment to disabled patrons. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 734. The
court noted that the class of wheelchair members is always open to new members
should anyone believe they are receiving preferential treatment. See id. The court
stated, however, that it did not anticipate "a rush of volunteers choosing to have
their legs amputated so they [might] watch a basketball game from a wheelchair
and thereby enjoy 'preferential' sightlines." Id.
118. See id. at 734.
119. See id. (noting that "[tihe only courts to have considered the issue ...
have reached different conclusions."). Compare Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. El-
lerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.D.C. 1996) (upholding
DOJ's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 as it appeared in TAM Supplement), with
Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 174 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1999)
(concluding that builder of arena was not required to provide lines of sight over
standing spectators before DOJ published its formal interpretation of Standard
4.33.3).
120. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 735.
121. See id. (rejecting defendant's timing argument). The court concluded
that although the TAM supplement may have been the first time the DOJ explicitly
declared its interpretation of the lines of sight standard, enforcement of an
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alyzed the administrative law aspects of the case and concluded that
the TAM supplement was not a valid interpretive regulation.1 22
Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Independent Living Resources court
rejected the assertion that the DOJ "did not adopt the commentary
published by the Access Board which discussed [the Board's] guide-
lines."123 The court recognized that when a legislative regulation is
issued pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of the APA,
an administrative agency is required to explain the purpose and
justification for the proposed rule in its commentary.124 Moreover,
an agency's commentary is required to respond to criticisms of the
rule.125 Because the DOJ did not adopt the Access Board's com-
mentary, the court concluded that "in order for the regulations to
be valid, the separate commentary published by the DOJ must be
sufficient to satisfy the notice and comment requirement." 126
agency's regulation did not have to wait until a formal opinion interpreting its
application. See id. Moreover the court noted that Congress explicitly stated that
"failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual
authorized by this Section does not excuse compliance with the ADA." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12206(e).
122. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 736-37.
123. Id. at 740 (emphasis in original).
124. See id. at 740 (citing Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir.
1996); see also Reyblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that agency must respond in reasoned manner to those
comments that raise significant problems); Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d
384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that agency is required "to give reasoned re-
sponses to all significant comments in a rule[-]making proceeding"); DAvIs &
PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 7.4 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996)).
125. See Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 740 (noting that "DOJ did not re-
spond to public comments regarding individual Standards, nor did DOJ explain
the agency's reasoning in adopting a specific standard or why it had rejected alter-
native language suggested by persons commenting on the proposed standards.").
Further, the court contrasted the "macro-level commentary by DOJ ... to the de-
tailed commentary" of the Board. Id. Although notice and comment rules have
"never been interpreted to require [an] agency to respond to every comment, or
to [analyze] every issue or alternative raised by comments," the separate commen-
tary adopted by the DOJ did not respond to any comments or analyze any issue
that arose from the proposed Standards. See id. (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v.
EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990); cf. U.S. Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC,
740 F.2d 1177, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "agency need not respond to
every comment so long as it responds in a reasoned manner to significant com-
ments received"); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that agency must respond to significant comments that would
require change in agency's proposed rule if adopted).
126. Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp. at 740. Although the DOJ argued that its
.commentary on the final rule fully satisfied the [APA's] requirements," the court
disagreed. See id.
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Therefore, the court ruled that the DOJ implicitly adopted the
Board's comments regarding the proposed guidelines. 127
Finally, the court examined whether the defendant had any
available defenses to the enforcement of a requirement for lines of
sight over standing spectators. 128 The court concluded that the de-
fendant "ha[d] no other defense, equitable or otherwise, to the en-
forcement of the line of sight requirement."1 29 The court rejected
the notion that the government misled the defendant in its inter-
pretation, as the evidence indicated that the defendant should be
aware that the law might require lines of sight over standing
spectators. 130
IV. IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Support for the objectives and purposes of laws enacted under
the ADA are undisputed. 131 Under current case law, however, the
127. See id. at 741 (noting that "[i]f the Access Board's commentary was not
binding upon DOJ, then that commentary and the entire notice and comment
procedure were largely an empty exercise."). Another factor influencing the
court's reasoning was that the DOJ's statement regarding comments received
"from the public regarding the proposed rule had been 'addressed adequately in
the final ADAAG' by the 'numerous changes' that the Access Board had made."
Id.
128. See id. at 747 (asking whether there is defense to such requirement if it
exists). Although the court reasoned that there was no requirement to provide
enhanced sightlines for wheelchair patrons, it sought to "simplify matters for the
Ninth Circuit, and to expediate [sic] any appeal" in determining whether defen-
dant had an existing defense to enhanced sightlines requirement. Id.
129. Id. The court rejected the notion that defendant may have the defense
of "structural impracticability" because that defense is limited to circumstances in
which sites contain unusual topographical features that preclude compliance with
the Standards. Id. (concluding that Rose Garden lacks such features).
130. See id. (determining that defendant did not rely "'in good faith' upon an
earlier interpretation of the law"). The court noted that the defendant designed
the Rose Garden after the ADA regulations became law and at that early date the
courts "had not explored the full extent of Title III's impact upon the design and
operation of indoor arenas." Id. The court, however, believed that "any compe-
tent attorney would advise their [sic] client to proceed with great caution knowing
their client was investing a quarter of a billion dollars in a project subject to unt-
ested standards." Id. Further, the court dismissed any contention by the defen-
dant that wheelchair users have never had enhanced sightlines. See id. at 748
(concluding that it is no defense to say "we've always discriminated against persons
with disabilities.").
131. See Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue?,
59 U. CIN. L. Rv. 1311, 1312 n.5 (1991) (noting that "[v]irtually every witness who
offered criticism of the ADA in congressional hearings testified of support for the
legislation's goals.") (citing Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Small Business, 101st Cong. 62, 79, 94 (1990) (statements of Rep. Tom Delay,
Joseph J. Dragonette on behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and David Pinkus
on behalf of National Small Business United, respectively)).
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issue of enhanced sightlines for disabled patrons is in a confused
state.1 32 The confused state of this area is due to the DOJ's failure
to define adequately its enhanced sightlines standard through
proper notice and comment procedures. 133 As a result, for many
disabled spectators, the ADA has not accomplished its goal in pro-
viding "effective access to sports arenas. '13 4
The recent settlement between Ellerbe Becket and the DOJ,
however, may bring some stability to this area of the law. 135 If this
does not occur, the United States Supreme Court may be the only
forum that can obtain consistency in this area of the law.' 36 It is
interesting to note that people tend to agree on the overall purpose
of the ADA but disagree when it comes to applying the ADA to real
life situations. 13 7
V. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Although most people support the ADA, disagreement exists
regarding proposed solutions to the problem of enhanced sight-
lines for wheelchair users. 138 There is the interest of the disabled
patrons who cannot see key moments of an event when those in
front of them stand. Also, there is the interest of the stadium oper-
ator who must bear the increased cost of providing disabled patrons
enhanced sightlines - although these patrons constitute a small
number of the overall audience attending sporting events. In order
to accommodate both of these interests a number of solutions have
been proposed.
132. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 286 (noting confused state of current law);
see also Katherine C. Carlson, Down in Front: Entertainment Facilities and Disabled Ac-
cess under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 897, 912
(1998) (stating that "[n]o one.., seems to know exactly what the ADA requires.");
id. at 915 (stating that because regulations fail to provide concrete guidance,
"courts are forced to step in to enforce compliance on a case-by-case basis.").
133. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 286 (noting that failure of DOJ to interpret
convincingly its own regulations "gives everyone involved in the [D.C. Arena], El-
lerbe Becket, Caruso, and Or[egon] Arena cases unneeded headaches."); see also Carl-
son, supra note 132, at 915 (acknowledging that "while the Department of Justice
issued broad [regulations], it has not seen fit to step up its statutorily mandated
role by providing concrete guidelines for architects and builders.").
134. Conrad, supra note 1, at 286.
135. See id. (noting that this settlement may bring "stability to a standard that
should have been adequately defined in the first place.").
136. See id. (stating that even if Supreme Court resolves this area of law, this
may just be first of many ambiguous issues in area of disability access).
137. See Carlson, supra note 132, at 912-15 (noting that disagreements arise
when ADA is applied to real life situations).
138. See id. at 912 (noting that problems with ADA are easy to see, but en-
forcement is inconsistent).
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A. Removable Seats
The "one percent plus one" formula included within the ADA
determines the number of wheelchair spaces required.13 9 This re-
quirement, however, does not "account for the financial impact un-
filled wheelchair spaces may have on an owner of a facility. ' 140 If a
stadium owner is forced to create spaces for wheelchair users, it
results in less space available for conventional seating.1 4 1 As a result
the stadium operator is forced to lose ticket sales.142
One proposal to accommodate stadium owners and comply
with the ADA would be for stadium owners to replace these unoccu-
pied areas with removable seats. 143 Section 4.33.3 allows "readily
removable seats [to] be installed in wheelchair spaces when the
spaces are not required to accommodate wheelchair users.' 44 This
solution could provide stadium operators the most economic flexi-
bility.145 Furthermore, this solution will provide wheelchair users
the most convenience and the greatest choice of seating and
pricing.146
The drawback to the solution of removable seats is that it gives
stadium owners "a powerful incentive to discourage wheelchair
139. See Standards, supra note 19, at pt. 36, App. A (stating that requirement
comes from Section 4.13(19) of ADAAG). For an explanation of the "one percent
plus one" requirement, see supra notes 26, 109-10 and accompanying text.
140. Carlson, supra note 132, at 913 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.406 (1996)).
141. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 1, at 285 (noting that Rose Garden's opera-
tors filled areas of wheelchair seating with conventional seats on regular basis); see
also Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena, 982 F. Supp. 698, 717 (D. Or. 1997) (noting
that at Portland Trailblazer basketball games, 133 wheelchair seats were replaced
with 1028 conventional seats resulting in $50,000 increase in ticket revenue for
each game and $2 million extra revenue for season).
142. See Standards, supra note 19, § 36.301(c) (stating that public accommo-
dation may not impose surcharge only on persons with disabilities to cover cost of
compliance with ADA); see also TAM Supplement, supra note 38, §§ 3-4.1400, 3-
4.4600 (expressing DOJ's position that "[p]eople with disabilities may not be sub-
jected to additional charges related to their use of a wheelchair.").
143. See Carlson, supra note 132, at 913; see also Robert P. Bennett, ADA Goes to
the Movies, PARAPLEGIA NEWS, Apr. 1994, at 53 (stating "[t ] he new baseball stadium
in Baltimore has a seating arrangement most people seem to like: About 400 con-
ventional seats simply fold out of the way to make room for wheelchairs .... This
same technology can be used effectively in a movie theatre [or other places of
exhibition], and it would not cause the same reduction of conventional seating
wheelchair stalls now cause.").
144. Standards, supra note 19, at pt. 36, App. A.
145. See Carlson, supra note 132, at 913 (stating that seats need only be re-
moved when there is use for them).
146. See id. (stating that owners could charge wheelchair users and other able
bodied patrons same amount because neither would be forced to sit in disabled
designated areas).
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use. '1 47 Because most tickets for professional teams are sold on a
season ticket basis and the majority of season ticket holders are
non-disabled, the availability of disabled seating may diminish.
148
This problem does not exist if a professional team moves into a new
arena with more seating or if ticket demand for games is not high
enough to sellout an arena.
149
B. Refusing to Sell Seats in Front of Wheelchair Patrons
The plan to refuse to sell seats in front of wheelchair patrons
was first proposed in Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers.15 0 The
problem with this solution is that in order to ensure that patrons in
other sections do not move to seats in front of wheelchair patrons,
these seats in front of wheelchair patrons would have to be "re-
moved or altered ... to keep them unoccupied."151 By using fold-
ing chairs, however, these seats could be removed only if the
wheelchair spaces behind them were occupied.1 52 Further, unlike
the policy to discourage patrons from standing, the no sell policy
does not force other patrons to accommodate wheelchair users,
"since everyone in the arena would be able to stand and cheer if
they wished. 153
147. Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena, 982 F. Supp. 698, 722 (D. Or. 1997)
(stating that "each wheelchair/companion pairing can be replaced by between five
and ten standard seats").
148. See id. at 719 (citing Portland as example of team whose majority of tick-
ets go to season ticket holders). The result of the Rose Garden's policy to sell most
seats on a season ticket basis is that "most wheelchair locations exist only on paper,
having been infilled [sic] with conventional seats and sold to ambulatory patrons
on a season ticket or longer basis." Id. Therefore, only fifteen percent of the lower
level seating accessible for wheelchair users were available to be purchased. See id.
(noting decreased availability of lower level wheelchair seating).
149. See Conrad, supra note 1, at 285 (predicting that season ticket holder
problems will appear in future if these factors are not present).
150. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950
F. Supp. 393, 403 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that this is more "design feature than an
operational measure.").
151. Id. (noting that this solution would not require patrons to alter their
activities).
152. See id.
153. Id. The Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers court concluded that because
a similar measure was approved by the DOJ at the Olympic Aquatic Center, this
seemed to be an option for stadium operators. See id. (recognizing policy as op-
tion). By implementing this solution, a certain degree of integration is lost be-
cause the seats in front of wheelchair patrons remain empty. See id. at 403 n.22
(noting integration loss). This does not create a compliance problem because rea-
sonable loss of integration does not affect compliance under Standard 4.33.3. See
id. (recognizing that same problem would occur if wheelchair locations were
moved to front row).
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C. Policy to Discourage Patrons from Standing During Play
In Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers, the policy of discouraging
patrons from standing during events was also proposed as a solu-
tion to the enhanced sightlines requirement. 154 This policy man-
dates stadium operators to make periodic announcements during
games that instruct patrons, with wheelchair users sitting behind
them, to refrain from standing during key moments of events.1 55
The Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers court recognized two
problems with this solution.1 56 First, this policy is likely to be less
effective than a design solution because people tend to stand in
reaction to excitement on the field.157 Second, this solution would
subject the wheelchair user to increased attention and possibly in-
creased hostility when seeking to enforce the "no standing"
policy.158
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1994 TAM Supplement should be interpreted to require
wheelchair locations to provide lines of .sight over standing specta-
tors. When Congress delegates authority to an administrative
agency to interpret its own regulations, the agency's interpretation
should be given deference "unless it is plainly erroneous or incon-
154. See id. at 402 (naming policy as "no stand" policy).
155. See Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. at 402 (describing policy
as "education and enforcement measure").
156. See id. (outlining problems).
157. See Carlson, supra note 132, at 914; see also Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engrs,
950 F. Supp. at 402 (noting that operational policy rather than structural policy is
likely to be insufficient to insure compliance). For new facilities, the court con-
cluded that operational policies are likely to be insufficient because the design and
construction of these stadiums must guarantee ready access to individuals with dis-
abilities. See Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. at 402 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12183(a) (1)). For existing stadiums, however, the court noted that operational
measures may be allowed as "alternative measures" under the ADA to remove ar-
chitectural barriers in existing facilities. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b) (2) (A) (iv)).
158. See id. at 402-03 (stating that because policy against standing only affects
areas where wheelchair users are stationed, all other non-disabled patrons may
stand except those seated in front of wheelchair patrons). The ADA prohibits poli-
cies that "screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any
class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, or accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (i).
Therefore, because this policy would likely single out wheelchair users and "pre-
vent them from fully enjoying the camaraderie and fellowship of a sporting contest
or other event" it was an impermissible solution to the enhanced sightlines prob-
lem. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs, 950 F. Supp. at 403.
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sistent with the regulation." 159 In order for courts to substitute
their own interpretation for an agency's, the agency's interpreta-
tion must be unreasonable. 160 To be considered unreasonable, an
agency's interpretation must (1) be consistent with the text of the
regulation; 61 and (2) be consistent with the purpose of the gov-
erning statute.' 62 Therefore, because the DOJ's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 is consistent with the text of Standard 4.33.3 and
consistent with the overall purpose of Title III of the ADA, the
DOJ's interpretation is reasonable and must be given deference.
Standard 4.33.3 states that wheelchair patrons must be pro-
vided "lines of sight comparable to . . . members of the general
public."' 63 When members of the general public have their view
inhibited by standing spectators, most can regain their view by
standing.' 64 Wheelchair patrons, however, cannot stand and there-
159. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991) (stating that "from this
congressional delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to judicial defer-
ence."); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (stating that "we presume that
the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency's lawmaking powers."); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that administrative agency's interpretation of its own
regulations should be given deference "unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."); Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. FERC, 117
F.3d 596, 600-01 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that "[c]ourts defer to agency interpreta-
tion in large part because Congress has chosen to delegate to the agency decision
making in the field" and deferring to FERC's interpretation of regulations that
were adopted from ICC); Manning, supra note 72, at 630 n.104 (noting that
"[a]uthorship is not an essential predicate to deference under Seminole Rock.");
Fritts, supra note 2, at 2664 (noting that rule of deference applies to DOJ's inter-
pretation of Standard 4.33.3 even though Board adopted regulation).
160. See Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. at 844 (discussing standard); Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (same); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)
(citing Seminole Rock rule); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994) (same); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (same); United
States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (same).
161. See Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 518 (deferring to agency's interpretation
because it was "faithful to the regulation's plain language"); Valkering, U.S.A., Inc.
v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 48 F.3d 305, 307 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that "we must
accept an agency's interpretation of it's own regulations, if it is reasonable in terms
of the words of the regulation") (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1149
(8th Cir. 1984)).
162. See Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872-73 (invalidating regulation, as interpreted
by Department of Defense, because it was found to be "contrary to the manifest
purposes of Congress"); see also Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063,
1070 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "however reasonable the agency's interpreta-
tion of its regulations, we must not give those regulations effect if they conflict with
the governing statute.").
163. Standards, supra note 19, at pt. 36, App. A.
164. See Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 733 (D. Or.
1997) (finding that "ambulatory spectators have the option of standing with the
rest of the crowd and can thereby recapture most of the lost view"); see also Para-
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fore lose their view when spectators stand. 165 Because a complete
view is more comparable to what the general public receives, re-
quiring wheelchair locations to have lines of sight over standing
spectators is a reasonable interpretation of Standard 4.33.3.
The overall purpose of Title III of the ADA is "to bring individ-
uals into the economic and social mainstream of American life."' 66
Attending concerts or sporting events at local arenas are an impor-
tant component of everyday life for most people. Wheelchair users,
however, are not likely to attend concerts or sporting events if they
cannot see the most important moments of the event.167 If wheel-
chair locations in stadiums are required to have lines of sight over
standing spectators, this measure will further the goal of social inte-
gration because more disabled patrons will attend concerts and
sporting events. By furthering the goal of social integration, Stan-
dard 4.33.3 is consistent with the intent of Tide III and, therefore, is
reasonable and requires deference.
James Kurack
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding
that ambulatory spectator can regain ninety percent of view by standing).
165. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Eng'rs., 950
F. Supp. 393, 400 n.16 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating that wheelchair users "will be af-
forded nearly no visibility" when spectators stand); Indep. Living Res., 982 F. Supp.
at 733 (noting that although short ambulatory patrons have their view blocked
when they stand, degree of blocked view is not as severe as wheelchair user's
blocked vision).
166. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989); H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23
(1990).
167. See Maryann Haggerty, Pollin Sued Over Design of MCI Center: Setup Will
Leave Wheelchair Users With Impeded View, Group Says, WASH. PosT, June 15, 1996, at
CI (quoting deputy executive director of Paralyzed Veterans of America, "The bot-
tom line here is if you can't See [sic] the game, you might as well stay at home and
watch it on TV, and that's the message we're getting from the MCI Center.").
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